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Abstract 1 
The main question posed in the paper asks why do some cooperative arrangements in 
agricultural markets survive and succeed and others fail? We define “success” and factors 
affecting  success  of  cooperation  using  transaction  costs  theory  and  game  theory. 
Transaction  costs  theory  provides  insights  on  comparative  advantage  of  one  form  of 
organization versus others and proposes, while game theory focuses on interdependencies 
between partners entering the arrangements.  Data were collected from 62 Polish farmer 
cooperative organizations called producer groups. The main aim of those organizations 
was to organize joint sales of output produced individually by their members. Some of 
the  groups  were  functioning  effectively  while  others  that  had  disbanded  or  were  no 
longer  performing  their  essential  functions.  Variables  such  as  the  leader’s  strength, 
previous business acquaintances, initial selection of members, and number of members 
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1 Introduction 
In the mid-1990s organizations called producer groups first appeared in Poland. Producer 
groups were formed by farmers, and their main purpose was to jointly sell agricultural 
output produced individually by members.  Farmers entering producer groups kept their 
distinct property rights, and they coordinated only on some transactions such as searching 
for buyers, negotiating contracts and transportation.  The groups adopted different legal 
forms  ranging  from  informal  oral  agreements,  through  associations,  unions,  limited 
liability companies and cooperatives.   
Data from an empirical survey carried out with leaders of producer groups located in 
Wielkopolska Province show a big disproportion in the performance of producer groups. 
First of all, at the time the research was carried out 20% of the groups were disbanded. 
Second, only 80% of functioning groups performed the main task of organizing joint 
sales of the output produced individually by member-farmers; others were engaged only 
in  organizing  such  activities  as  joint  transportation,  joint  purchase  of  the  means  of 
production, organizing trainings for members and other social events. Third, some of the 
functioning  groups  that  performed  joint  sales  were  not  able  to  negotiate  any  price 
premium for their members’ output and were selling their products at the same price as 
non-members  farmers;  others  were  able  to  negotiate  as  much  as  a  39%  higher  price 
premium for their members (Banaszak 2006a).  
The  central  question  posed  in  this  article is why  such big  differences  among the 
producer groups exist. Why do some of the cooperative organizations fail over time, why 
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do  some  keep  existing  without  performing  their  main  functions,  and  why  do  others 
expand and build up their market power?  
Success  and  failure  of  cooperative  enterprises  in  agricultural  markets  has  been 
subjected to empirical research; however, the literature merely focuses on organizations 
that were operating and performing their main tasks at the time the research was carried 
out. What also emerges from the literature review is that the authors define success of 
cooperative organizations in very different terms. Bruynis (1997), for instance, executed 
an empirical survey with 52 American marketing cooperatives and distinguished eight 
keys to success, understood in terms of longevity, business  growth, profitability, and 
member satisfaction.  Such factors as implementation of a management training process; 
employing  an  experienced,  full-time  general  manager;  regularly  distributing  accurate 
financial statements among the management team; using marketing agreements to secure 
business  volume  commitments  from  the  members;  and  utilizing  human  resources 
appeared to be significant for the researched organizations achieving success (Bruynis 
1997: 54).  Sexton and Iskow (1988), who built their study around vertical integration 
theory, distinguished three groups of organizational, financial, and operational keys to 
success  of  agricultural  cooperatives.    The  authors  surveyed  61  U.S.  agricultural 
cooperatives and asked the respondents to rank their cooperatives on a four-level success 
scale.  Such factors as open membership, accepting nonmember business, and employing 
full-time management were correlated with self-understood success.   
Among research including disbanded organizations, we find Ziegenhorn (1999), who 
based  his  research  on  economic  anthropology  and  New  Institutional  Economics  and 
carried out a few case studies of farmer production networks in the swine industry.  The 
author also investigated cases of actors failing to cooperate.  The greatest responsibility 
for a network’s success or failure in terms of its survival was attributed to a network 
organizer  whose  knowledge  and  selection  of  participating  farmers  influenced 
compatibility (Ziegenhorn 1999: 66).  
The  definition  of  the  success  of  cooperative  enterprises  proposed  in  this  study  is 
based on transaction costs theory and game theory. The choice of transaction cost theory 
was motivated by its focus on comparison between different  modes of organizations. 
Producer groups are only one possible way of organizing transactions between farmers 
and  purchasers  of  their  products.  Another  way  is  a  direct  exchange  or  an  exchange 
through a middleman. The theory provides insights on the comparative advantage of one 
form of organization versus others. The choice of game theory was motivated by its focus 
on interdependencies and strategic behavior of  actors. Once farmers enter a producer 
group their choices and actions become interdependent. For the sake of the group, the 
best would be if they all cooperated and respected the rules agreed upon. However, under 
certain  conditions  those  farmers  who  break  the  group  rules  might  earn  more.  Game 
theory provides insights on both external and internal factors that might either facilitate 
or  hinder cooperation.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for 
investigating success and failure of cooperative organizations such as producer groups 
and identifies propositions to be tested further.  Section 3 presents the methodology of the 
research, and section 4 presents the empirical evidence.  Finally, Section 5 concludes and 
discusses the results.   
   4 
2 Theoretical Framework  
In this section we are going to construct a definition of success of producer groups based 
on transaction cost theory (Section 2.1) and game theory (Section 2.2). Each theory also 
provides insights on factors affecting the likelihood of achieving success by cooperative 
organizations. Sometimes the factors overlap. We thus develop propositions 1 to 5 based 
on transaction costs arguments and propositions 6 to 11 based on game theory arguments.    
2.1 Success or Failure of Farmers’ Cooperative Enterprises in Light of Transaction 
Costs Theory 
Regarding the implementation of their main task—that is, organizing joint sales of the 
output produced by individual member farmers—producer  groups act as intermediary 
market organizations that coordinate the exchange of goods and services between farmers 
and purchasers of their produce.  Intermediaries are firms that seek out suppliers, find and 
encourage  purchasers,  select  buy  and  sell  prices,  organize  the  transactions,  keep  the 
records, and hold inventories to supply liquidity or availability of goods and services 
(Spulber 1999: 3).  Intermediaries appear on the market if the net gains from trade exceed 
those  obtained  through  direct  exchange.    The  profit  of  intermediaries  is  raised  by 
identifying  innovative  transactions  that  either  increase  gains  from  trade  or  reduce 
transaction  costs  associated  with  search,  negotiation,  communication,  computation, 
contracting, and monitoring the transaction and its partners (Spulber 1999: 259, 260).  In 
this  respect,  producer  groups  take  the  role  traditionally  fulfilled  on  the  market  by 
middlemen and other traders.  Nonetheless, the advantage to producer groups, which puts 
them in competition with middlemen and traders are the potential savings on transaction 
costs offered to the farmers associated in producer groups due to horizontal and vertical 
integration.  Horizontal  integration  occurs  between  different  businesses  located  on the 
same level of the channel (Caputo & Mininno 1996: 64) and, in producer groups, takes 
place due to the association of farmers into one organization.  Vertical integration occurs 
between businesses located at different stages of the channel (Caputo & Mininno 1996: 
64) and, in producer groups, takes place whenever the groups move up in the market 
channel  while  organizing  joint  transportation  or  processing  the  produce.    The  main 
intermediary function of producer groups is therefore coordinating an exchange of goods 
and  services  between  individual  member  farmers  and  purchasers  of  the  farmers’ 
agricultural output (Figure 1).  Producer groups also undertake the intermediary function 








Figure 1:  Exchange With and Without an Intermediary and a Producer Group 
Between Farmers and Purchasers of Their Output  
Source: Adapted from Spulber (1999: 264) 
 
Nonetheless, producer groups are not classic firms.  Firms integrate property rights, 
thus subsuming all transaction costs related to the production of goods and/or services 
(Ménard 2005: 294).  Farmers associated in producer groups do not integrate property 
rights and do not merge their farms into one organization.  Each of them individually 
makes the final decision on how to produce the good and when and to whom to sell it.  
Producer  groups  of  informal  character  cannot  even  sign  any  official  agreement  with 
purchasers on behalf of farmers, since they do not have a legal form recognized by law.  
Such hybrid arrangements, in between market and firm modes of governance, cover only 
a subset of the transactions in which participating firms are involved (Ménard 2005: 294).  
In  hybrid  organizations  functioning  in  agriculture,  the  advantage  of  keeping  separate 
ownership  rights  and  not  merging  farmers  into  one  farming  enterprise  is  that  due  to 
idiosyncratic knowledge specific for farming it would be impossible for a company to 
accurately judge the quality of farmers’ inputs (Bonus 1986: 331-331).  
An intermediary will be functioning if an exchange of a particular good or service 
through an intermediary yields the buyer value V
I which entails opportunity costs C
I for 
the seller, and the total transaction costs for the buyer, seller, and the intermediary T
I is 
higher than exchange of that good or service through direct exchange, which yields the 
buyer value V
D and entails opportunity costs C
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the buyer and seller T
D (Sulber 1999: 256, 261).  Furthermore, we may expect that a 
producer group will appear on the market if it is able to organize transactions yielding the 
value V
PG which entails opportunity costs C
PG and transactions costs T
PG that are higher 











D                                             (1) 
 
We  may  propose  that  successful  producer  groups  will  be  those  that  manage  to 
coordinate the exchange between farmers and purchasers and that additionally operate 
at  per  unit  costs  not  exceeding  per  unit  costs  of  organizing  the  transaction  through 
alternative ways, such as decentralized exchange or intermediation by other agents. 




exchange through a producer group will occur when it increases the net gains from direct 
and intermediary exchange:                                                                                               
V
D – C
D  <  V
PG – C
PG  > V
I – C
I 
A rise in the net gains from trade can occur if a more valuable transaction is produced 
at  the  same  level  of  transaction  costs.  This  can  take  place  by  supplying  additional 
services  which  increase  buyer  willingness  to  pay  or  lower  seller  opportunity  costs 
(Spulber  1999:  261).  A  producer  group  could  increase  the  net  gains  from  trade,  for 
instance, by accepting a delay in payments from purchasers, which usually is hard to 
accept for individual farmers, or by offering a uniform product. 
If three types of transactions yield the same gains from trade,   
V
PG – C
PG  = V
I – C
I  = V
D – C
D, an exchange through a producer group occurs if it 
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The  level  of  transaction  costs  can  be  decreased  by  increasing  the  frequency  of 
transactions. The more frequently the transaction takes place, the lower the fixed costs 
per unit (Ménard 2006: 28). In a producer group situation, frequency of transactions can 
be raised through increasing the number of members. Additionally, enlarging the number 
of  organization  members  might  decrease  the  danger  of  opportunistic  behavior  and 
internal rent seeking by members since it implies a lower share in the organization’s 
profits for each individual and discourages internal rent seeking. Those organizations that 
survive are not the most profitable but are most successful at solving problems of internal 
rent seeking (Kräkel 2006:2, 21). 
Proposition 1. The number of members is expected to have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of formation of a successful producer group. 
Nonetheless, decreasing transaction costs by enlarging the number of group members 
increases internal coordination and bureaucracy costs.  Producer groups should therefore 
have  to  bear  the  costs  of  coordinating  farmer  actions  and  organizing  production, 
marketing,  and  administration.  Internal  coordination  costs  might  be  decreased  by 
leadership.  A  strong  central  coordinator  enables  the  group  to  save  on  both  total 
transaction information transmission and decision-making costs (Williamson 1983: 41, 
45). However, developing an adequate information system among partners also matters.  
An  overly-strong,  dominant  leader  who  can  capture  information  is  a  threat  to  the 
continuity of the relationship in hybrid forms of governance (Ménard 2004: 351).     7 
Proposition 2. A stronger leader contributes to saving on internal transaction costs and 
thus is expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood of formation of successful 
producer groups up to a point;  however, an overly-strong, dominant leader reduces the 
likelihood of success. 
Sharing rents in hybrids, however, involves a danger of opportunistic behavior that 
can potentially provoke conflicts.  Therefore, the identity of partners is important and 
their selection is a key element (Ménard 2004: 351).  In most cases, the selection of 
partners  is  based  on  previous  experience  in  market  relationships,  on  previous  hybrid 
arrangements, and/or on reputation (Ménard 2004: 361).  Hence, we may expect that both 
selection of alliance partners and previous business relationships in which the partners 
had an impact on formation of successful producer groups.  A similar argument is put 
forward  by  Whipple  and  Frankel  (2000),  who  discuss  strategic  alliances.    Firms 
implementing  alliances  have  problems  with  the  transition  from  adversarial  to  a 
cooperative  relationship;  the  changes  in  mind-set,  culture,  and  behavior  can  be 
overwhelming.  The largest barrier to alliance success is organizational culture.  It is the 
greatest cost for alliances, and it takes a long time to modify partners’ traditional habits 
and beliefs while adopting new ways of conducting business (Whipple and Frankel 2000: 
22).  
Proposition  3.  Selection  of  members  and  having  a  previous  business  relationship 
between the members is expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood of formation 
of successful producer groups. 
The nature of safeguards needed for securing the agreement and the significance of 
contractual hazards will be determined by the level and forms of specific investments 
undertaken for a specific arrangement (Ménard 2005: 298).  “The more specific mutual 
investments are, the higher the risks of opportunistic behavior and the tighter the forms of 
control  implemented”  (Ménard  2004: 355).   The  choice  of  government structure  and 
contract  arrangements  is  thus  critical  for  survival  of  alliances.    The  anticipated 
complexity  of  tasks  and  coordination  is  a  major  factor  in  the  choice  of  a  specific 
governance  mode and in the design of  mechanisms for monitoring the arrangements.  
Contracts  play  a  crucial  role  in  coordinating  partners;  in  particular,  they  specify  the 
number of parties included in the agreement and its duration (Ménard 2004: 351-2, 361).  
These arguments stress the role of both level of investments and the nature of contractual 
arrangements for the likelihood of achieving success with hybrid arrangements.  
Regarding  the  institutional  framework  in  which  the  Polish  producer  groups  are 
functioning, the tighter the forms of control implemented by producer groups, the higher 
their set up and organizational costs.  Hence, we may expect that farmers who do not 
undertake any joint investments will choose the loosest and cheapest form of informal 
group.  As we explain in detail in Sections 3.4 and 5.9, association and union require 
higher time and money investments, and their accumulated capital is legally protected.  In 
association, however, the partners have no right to withdraw the accumulated capital or 
profits.  The accumulated capital and profits can only be spent on the organizational 
activities defined in the statute (Legislation: Act from 7
th April 1989, Art. 34).  Unions 
are more flexible with regard to the law, but the generated profits have to be equally 
distributed among all members (Ejsmont & Milewski 2005: 65).  Farmers who undertake 
considerable  investment  will  therefore  be  expected  to  adopt  not  only  the  most 
safeguarding, but also the most costly form – the commercial company (Legislation: Act   8 
from 15
th September 2000b).  Similar establishment and running costs follow the choice 
of the organizational form of cooperative.  This form, however, involves less control over 
the capital due to the decision-making process in which each member has equal decision-
making power irrespective of the invested capital (Legislation: Act from 16
th September 
1982, Art. 36, § 3).   
Proposition 4. Groups that make a higher initial capital investment have to choose a 
legal  form  that  provides  an  appropriate  level  of  safeguards  corresponding  to  the 
coordination costs. If this decision is mismatched, groups will suffer either too-high costs 
or opportunistic behavior.  Consequently, they are expected to be more likely to fail.  
Hybrids tend to develop in highly competitive markets in which pooling resources is 
a  way  to  survive  and  to  decrease  uncertainty  (Ménard  2005:  295).    Competition  is 
beginning  to  shift  from  firm  versus  firm  to  supply  chain  versus  supply  chain,  which 
creates the  need  for integration  strategies  (Bowersox et  al. 1999).    Competition  may 
destabilize  hybrid  forms,  since  the  partners  might  be  tempted  to  switch  among 
arrangements, particularly if investments in the cooperation are only moderately specific.  
The  problem  that  hybrids  face  is  therefore  which  mechanism  to  adopt  in  order  to 
delineate joint decisions, discipline partners, and solve conflicts while preventing free 
riding  (Ménard  2005:  295-6).    On  the  one  hand,  competition  might  increase  the 
likelihood  of  producer  group  formation;  on  the  other,  the  resultant  instability  of  the 
arrangements may affect the likelihood of success. 
Proposition 5. Competition may destabilize cooperative arrangements and thus 
 is expected to have a negative impact on the likelihood of achieving success by producer 
groups. 
2.2  Success  or  Failure  of  Farmers’  Cooperative  Enterprises  in  Light  of  Game 
Theory 
The  interdependencies  among  members  of  producer  groups  could  be  modeled  as  a 
coordination game, prisoner’s dilemma or a public goods game.  In coordination games 
the choice of a certain cooperation strategy by all the players results in a Pareto superior 
Nash  equilibrium,  but  each  coordination  game  might  have  more  than  one  Nash 
equilibrium.    The  problem  here  is  how  to  coordinate  players  on  the  most  efficient 
equilibrium (Rasumusen 2001: 29). In coordination game settings the producer group is 
able to negotiate higher prices for the members’ produce by enlarging the quantities of 
the product offered on the market, which could result in lowering per-unit transaction 
costs.  In  terms  of  Equation  1,  the  game  describes  a  situation  where  direct  exchange 
among  farmers  and  purchasers  of  their  output  is  replaced  by  establishing  a  producer 
group.  If  other  parameters  stay  constant,  a  higher  net  gain  from  trade  through  the 
producer  group  is  due  to  its  lower  transaction  costs  in  comparison  with  the  direct 
exchange: 
T
PG  < T
D                                                          
   
  In both prisoner’s dilemma and public goods games, the dominant strategy for each of 
the players is not to cooperate with the other players.  If the majority of the players 
chooses this strategy, however, it brings worse payoffs for all of them.  The dominant 
strategy equilibrium in this game is not engaging in cooperation, but all group members 
would  be  better  off  cooperating  than  defecting  (Dawes  and  Messick  2000:  111).  A 
prisoner’s  dilemma  game  might  be  experienced  by  producer  groups  which  have  to   9 
compete  with  other  intermediaries  such  as  middlemen,  and  if  the  group  is  unable  to 
negotiate  a  sufficiently  high price  premium  or  has  entered  into a  long-term  contract, 
farmers might deviate from the group rules and sell their output through a competing 
intermediary.  If  other  parameters  stay  constant,  in  such  a  situation  the  value  of  a 
transaction  organized  through  the  producer  group  will  be  lower  than  the  value  of  a 
transaction organized through the intermediary: 
V
PG <  V
I 
  A public goods game might be played by producer groups which mange to increase 
the value of the transaction, by providing a product of a better quality; however, if only 
the average quality matters, those members might earn more who free ride and do not 
contribute to sustaining the quality standards.  
We may propose that successful producer groups manage to set the game in such a 
way  that  all  players  choosing  a  certain  cooperative  strategy  will  achieve  a  Pareto 
superior Nash equilibrium, from which none of the players has an incentive to deviate.  
In addition, as suggested by Binger and Hoffman (1989: 68), some social arrangements 
also arise as inefficient equilibriums of repeated games and endure because no one would 
benefit  from  a  unilateral  change.  We  may  expect  that  some  producer  groups  keep 
functioning despite failing to coordinate their members on achieving the most efficient 
equilibrium.  Such  groups  might  be  only  engaged  in  organizing  activities  like  joint 
purchases of the means of production or trainings and educational activities.  Payoffs 
from organizing such activities are expected to be lower than from organizing joint sales.  
However, coordination on these activities is more likely to be achieved, and the game is 
less vulnerable to market conditions that could transform the game into a social dilemma. 
If one farmer refuses to buy a certain amount of fertilizer purchased by the group, it is 
easy to sell it to someone else. Defection in such situations does not imply major losses.  
Banaszak  and  Beckmann  (2006b)  point  out  that  some  variables  related  to  the 
environment  in  which  cooperation  takes  place  and  to  group  structure  might  either 
facilitate or hinder cooperation. One of the factors which might decrease the likelihood of 
achieving successful cooperation is competition. As pointed out above, competition with 
other  intermediaries  might  increase  the  likelihood  of  deviation  from  group  rules 
expressed through sales outside, and thus decreases the likelihood of achieving success 
by producer groups:  
Proposition 6. Competition may increase the likelihood of playing a prisoner’s dilemma 
game  and  thus  is  expected  to have  a  negative  impact  on  the  likelihood  of achieving 
success by producer groups. 
  Furthermore, several authors point out that irrespectively of game setting leadership is 
a  factor  that  facilitates  cooperation.  In  coordination  games,  leadership  as  a  form  of 
hierarchy helps to coordinate member actions on one of multiple equilibria, and therefore 
lowers bargaining costs that players would have to spend to agree on and implement one 
of  the  strategies  (Miller  1992:  50).  Leadership  might  also  additional  utility  from 
reciprocating cooperation (Foss 1998: 13, 22; Shamir et al. 1993: 577). Strong leaders 
might also make the threat of punishing shirking players more feasible.  Banaszak and 
Beckmann  (2006a:  17)  show  that  leaders’  decision-making  power  was  significantly 
correlated with exercising sanctions in producer groups in Poland.  Due to additional 
utility from reciprocating cooperation, the payoff structure in a prisoners’ dilemma game 
might be transformed into a coordination game.     10 
Proposition  7.  Leadership  facilitates  cooperation  in  all  game  settings  and  thus  is 
expected to increase the likelihood of achieving success by producer groups. 
Another factor that might influence cooperation rates is group size.  Larger groups 
find it harder to communicate and coordinate their actions (Olson 1965: 59-60). Other 
studies argue the opposite. Sandler (1992: 35) discusses provision of public goods and 
argues that not only group size but also cost allocation and technological considerations 
play a role. Issac et al. (1994) provide results that  groups of size 40 and 100 provide a 
public good more efficiently than groups of size 4 and 10. Kollock (1998: 201) points out 
that too many parameters are changing tandem with the group size and thus assessing the 
impact of this parameter might be problematic.  
Proposition 8. The number of members in producer groups has an indeterminate impact 
on the likelihood of achieving success by producer groups.  
Furthermore, Kleindorfer et al. (1993: 247-251) point out that homogeneous groups 
with similarities in the partners’ potential power and interests are more likely to achieve a 
higher  cooperation  rate.  Haag  and  Lagunoff  (2003:  21)  examine  characteristics  of 
cooperative behavior in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game and provide arguments that 
homogenous  groups  in  respect  to  time  preferences  of  their  members  are  more 
cooperative. The larger the differences in players’ time preferences, the less cooperative 
is the group (Haag and Lagunoff 2003: 7).  
Proposition  9.  Members’  homogeneity  is  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the 
likelihood of achieving success by producer groups.  
In  addition,  groups  in  which  players  interact  more  durably  or  frequently  increase 
identifiably, and information about individuals’ past actions are expected to cause higher 
cooperation (Axelrod 1984: 62-63). Knowing the identity and history of other players 
allows the group to develop a reputation, which in turn enables the players to respond in 
an appropriate manner (Axelrod 1984: 62-63, Kleindorfer et al. 1993: 247-251, Kollock 
1998: 199). Ahn et al. (2001: 137) show that in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma experiment 
success  in  coordinating  on  the  payoff  dominant  equilibrium  in  previous  plays  of 
coordination  games  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  probability  of  cooperating  in  the 
prisoner’s dilemma game.  
Proposition 10. Preplay members’ acquaintance is expected have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of achieving success by producer groups.  
In  a  similar  way,  communication  structures  may  encourage  better  exchange  of 
information about the individuals involved in the interaction.  Kollock (1998) mentions a 
number  of  studies  that  point  out  that  communication  promotes  cooperation.  
Communication allows players to make explicit commitments and promises about their 
future moves and to appeal to the “right” or “proper” thing to do, thus exerting moral 
pressure. Brosig and Weimann (2003) examine communication effects in public goods 
experiments that only differ with respect to pre-play communication. The results indicate 
that successful cooperation might be attributed to the opportunity to coordinate behavior 
in the communication phase. However, the success of communication depends strongly 
on the communication medium. The results show that the most efficient is face-to-face 
communication. Interestingly, it did not make a difference whether people were sitting at 
the same table or watching each other on a video screen  (Brosig and Weimann 2003: 
217, 231).    11 
Proposition 11. Communication among players is expected to have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of achieving success by producer groups.  
3. Research design 
3.1. Methods and techniques of the research 
Producer groups in one province were selected as the object of the research.  The chosen 
province of Wielkopolska is one of 16 provinces in Poland and is located in the western 
part of the country. The cross-sectional research design was selected as a research method 
for this investigation.  This design employed the technique of social survey, which uses a 
structured interview with producer group leaders as the data collection strategy.  Fifty 
functioning groups and 12 disbanded groups were subjected to the research.  The 50 
functioning groups associated 4,056 farmers; the 12 inactive ones associated 394 farmers. 
The interviews were carried out in early 2005.  
The  structured  interview  with  producer  group  leaders  was  organized  into  a 
questionnaire composed of six sections which addressed: (i) general information about 
the group such as the group’s address, legal status, number of members, and activities 
performed, (ii) the process of group formation, (iii) group functioning (divided into three 
sections: management and decision making, production and marketing, and membership), 
(iv) costs and benefits of cooperation, (v) the role of the institutional environment, and 
(vi)  leadership.    These  six  sections  comprised  132  questions  in  total.   Two  types  of 
questions were asked: the first was related to facts such as numbers or descriptions of 
processes, the second to the subjective evaluation of these facts.  
3.2. Computation of variables 
An ordinal probit model was employed in the research.  The ordinal regression model is a 
nonlinear model in which the magnitude of change in the outcome probability for a given 
change in one of the independent variables depends on the levels of all of the independent 
variables (Long & Freese 2001: 137).  
Additionally,  in  order  to  compare  differences  in  the  mean  values  of  variables 
characterizing  distinguished categories of  success,  we  have  used one-way  analysis  of 
variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA involves one independent variable (referred to as a factor), 
which has a number of different levels.  These levels correspond to the distinguished 
different  groups.   ANOVA  compares  the  variance (variability in  scores) between the 
different  groups  (believed  to  be  due  to  the independent  variable)  with the  variability 
within each of the groups (believed to be due to chance).  A significant F test indicates 
that we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that means across the groups are equal 
(Pallant 2001: 186).   
4 Empirical Results  
4.1 Measuring “Success”  
As reviewed in Section 1, different definitions have been applied to measure success 
and  failure  of  cooperative  enterprises.    Bruynis  (1997)  defines  success  in  terms  of 
longevity, business growth, profitability, and members’ satisfaction. Sexton and Iskow 
(1988) measure success based on self-evaluation. Ziegenhorn (1999) understands success 
of networks in terms of their survival.     12 
In Section 2 we proposed two new definitions of success and failure of producer 
groups  based  on  transaction  costs  theory  and  game  theory.  As  suggested  by  the 
transaction costs investigation, successful producer groups will be those that manage to 
coordinate the exchange between farmers and purchasers and that additionally operate at 
per unit costs, which do not exceed per unit costs of organizing the transaction through 
alternative ways, such as decentralized exchange or intermediation of other agents.  Such 
understood success could be measured by either investigating the price premium that the 
groups negotiate for the members’ output, or by investigating whether the benefits of the 
groups’  functioning  are  higher  than  its  costs.    Price  premium  was  measured  by 
questioning percent difference between the price obtained by group members for their 
products and that obtained by nonmember farmers on the market.  On average, producer 
group members were selling their products at a 6.2% higher price premium.  Twenty-
seven groups were either not selling jointly at all or were selling their products at a 0 
price premium.  Two groups were able to negotiate a price premium as high as 39.3% 
(SD=10.32).  Regarding whether producer groups were obtaining higher benefits than 
operation costs, the question was coded as a dummy variable, in which 1 stood for having 
higher benefits than operation costs.  Fifty-one percent of the interviewed producer group 
leaders classified their groups as obtaining higher benefits from operation than costs. 
As pointed out by the game theory analysis, we may distinguish a few categories of 
success or failure of producer groups. The first category is disbanded groups which are 
clear examples of failure in coordinating farmers to achieve Pareto-efficient equilibriums.  
Twelve groups that disbanded were identified in the research process.   
Some  producer  groups  are  nevertheless  expected  to  continue  functioning,  despite 
failing  to  coordinate  their  members  on  achieving  the  most  efficient  equilibria.   Such 
groups  might only be  engaged in organizing such activities as joint purchases of the 
means of production or trainings and educational activities.  Payoffs from organizing 
such activities are expected to be lower than from organizing joint sales.  Coordination on 
these activities is more likely to be achieved, and the game is less vulnerable to market 
conditions that could transform the game into a social dilemma.  We therefore propose to 
include these groups into the second category of partial failure.  The groups failed to 
coordinate  farmers  on a  Pareto  superior  equilibrium but  still  provided  their  members 
some collective action benefits.  Within the research process we have identified 10 such 
groups. 
But how does one measure the success of producer groups?  The game theoretical 
analysis suggested that successful producer groups are those that manage to set the game 
in such a way that if all players choose a certain cooperative strategy, a Pareto superior 
Nash equilibrium will be achieved.  None of the players have incentives to deviate from 
this equilibrium.  Such understood success could be measured by the deviation rate from 
joint sales organized by the groups.  We may assume that if the group is not able to 
convince the members that it has the best possible market arrangement, members will 
simply sell their products to other purchasers.  Hence, we may propose to include groups 
that did not experienced members’ defection in joint sales in a third category of success, 
and those who did into a fourth category of partial success.  In the research, 33 groups 
classified as partial success and seven groups classified as success were identified.   
Below  we  present  how  the  identified  measurements  of  producer  group  success 
correspond  to  each  other.  For  comparison  of  the  distinguished  based  on  the  theory   13 
categories with self-perception of the actors involved in cooperation, we also include a 
self-evaluated  measure  of  success  suggested  by  Sexton  and  Iskow  (1988).  The 
interviewed producer group leaders could rank their groups as a major success, a minor 
success, “too early to say,” or unsuccessful.  Forty percent of the interviewees classified 
their groups as unsuccessful (ranked as 0), 8% as “too early to say” (ranked as 1), 27.4% 
as having achieved minor success (ranked as 2), and 24.2% as having achieved major 
success (ranked as 3).  Most of the leaders (40.3%) understood self-evaluated success or 
failure of their groups in terms of the ability to profitably market member output.  For 
24.2%  success  or  failure  of  their  groups  was  understood  in  terms  of  the  ability  to 
function,  and  17.7%  in  terms  of  the  ability  to  get  farmers  together.    Other  groups 
evaluated their success or failure in terms of achieving initial goals (6.4%), obtaining 
subsidies  (4.8%),  acquiring  investments  (3.2%),  and  achieving  good  product  quality 
(3.2%).  
  Since the variable indicating four categories of success, which were distinguished 
according to game theory, was the only one correlated at the most significant level with 
the  remaining  variables,  we  decided  to  use  this  variable  in  the  subsequent  empirical 
analysis (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2:  Correlations Between the Variables Indicating Different Measures of 
Producer Group Success 
 
4.2 Characteristic of the Dependent Variable 
We treat the distinguished categories of success as the dependent variable. In the next 
section we are going to test the impact of the propositions suggested in Section 2 on the 
likelihood of achieving success. However, before we do so, in this section we would like 
to provide a description of the dependent variable and explore the differences between 
the four distinguished categories in respect to basic characteristics of producer groups 
such as the year of establishment, number of members, impetus for formation, level of 
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performed. We use the ANOVA technique in order to compare whether the differences in 
the basic characteristics across the distinguished categories are statistically significant. 
Category 1: Failure 
Twelve  groups  that  had  ended  their  cooperation  were  subjected  to  the  research.  
Before the groups disbanded, they had associated 394 farmers, an average of 33 members 
per group.  The smallest group had only eight members, the biggest 60.  Most of those 
groups were created in 1999 and disbanded soon after, the most in 2001. The oldest 
group from this category was created in 1995, the youngest in 2001. On average each 
group was functioning for 2.8 years. One functioned less that a year, one was disbanded 
after 8 years of operation.  
Thirty-three  percent  of  these  groups  were  formed  as  an  initiative  of  the  farmers 
involved, and a further 17% as an initiative of outside businessmen.  Interestingly, 50% 
of the groups in this category were established in a result of an initiative of the extension 
service.  
The majority of these groups preferred the simple legal form of association (66.7%).  
Three  groups  (25%)  were  functioning  as  limited  liability  companies,  one  as  a  union 
(8.3%).    The  simple  yet  “loose”  legal  form  of  association  was  preferred  for  fear  of 
bureaucracy, taxation, and of being bound together too closely and too soon.  The most 
frequent type of output produced by group members was pork (58.3%) and vegetables 
(16.7%).  There  was  one  group  (8.3%)  that  associated  farmers  producing  fruits,  one 
producing grains, and one with general production. The mean value of invested capital 
for groups in this category was 1,104 EUR (32 EUR per member). 
We also shortly review here data on factors the interviewed producer groups leaders 
pointed to as critical for the failure of their groups. The most frequently reported problem 
was a so-called “mentality of the people” which had to do with commitment, loyalty and 
trust  in  the  leader  and  other  members.  Two  groups  did  not  want  to  change  their 
purchasers to those appointed by the leader, and in three cases the members did not want 
to compensate the leader for his work or to hire a manager. Regarding other cases, two 
groups reported having problems with finding purchasers; one group was destroyed by a 
middleman who offered members a higher price if they sold their output outside the 
group;  in  one  case  the  group  was  embedded  in  a  conflict  between  two  neighboring 
villages, and inhabitants of one village spread false information about the leader in order 
to destroy the group; and in the last case the leader pocketed the groups’ money and 
members did not want to continue cooperation afterwards.      
Category 2: Partial failure 
We studied ten groups that were functioning but not performing joint sales of output 
produced by the member farmers.  Half of these groups were created in 1999.  The oldest 
group was created in 1992, the youngest in 2004.  The groups associated 293 farmers, 
and each one associated an average of 30 farmers.  The smallest group had only six 
members, the biggest 69.  Four groups associated farmers producing pork, with one group 
in each production type: cattle, fruits, grains, vegetables, mushrooms, and poultry.    
Most of the groups were initiated by one farmer or a group of farmers (70%); the 
other 30% were initiated by an outside organization, in two cases by the extension service 
and in one case by a processing company.  Half of the groups chose the legal form of 
association, while 30% chose a union.  The remaining two groups (20%) were registered   15 
as limited liability companies.  Simple forms of association and union were preferred due 
to a desire to avoid costs such as taxes, which were required from groups functioning as 
an LLC or cooperative.  Some interviewees from groups that preferred the simplest forms 
reported  that  farmers  at  first  wanted  to  do  something  simple  without  investing  any 
capital:  should it be possible, they intended to engage themselves in more complicated 
activities.  Regarding the start-up capital, on average groups in this category collected 
5,013 EUR (471 EUR per member). 
None of these groups performed the task of organizing joint sales at the time the 
interviews were carried out.  Three groups (30%) were selling jointly for some time but 
then  stopped.    One  group  stopped joint  sales  because  a  dishonest  member  took  over 
group contracts.  Another disbanded due to a decrease in prices on the market.  The last 
one was saddled with financial problems caused by the deceitfulness of a purchaser, who 
took a great deal of the group’s output without paying for it.  Almost all of the groups, 
however, were  active in other fields—joint supply of production  means for  members 
(70% of the groups), trainings and educational trips (70%), joint transportation (10%), 
and integration events for the members (40%).  Another group organized joint packages 
for the members’ output, and one other joint sorting, packing and storing.  Only one 
group did not perform any of these tasks; the only thing the members did was meet once 
a month to discuss their problems. Groups in this category could not obtain subsidies 
from the national and EU budgets since they were not performing joint sales (subsidies 
were paid as a percentage of total turnover of the group, from which at least 50% had to 
be generated from joint sales) (Legislation: Act from 15
th September 2000b, art. 3 § 4; 
details  on  the  conditions  for  obtaining  subsidies  are  explained  in  Section  5.9). 
Nonetheless, it is interesting that one group with the help of an extension service official, 
recorded fictitious joint sales, and thus managed to obtain the subsidies.  
Category 3: Partial success 
Subjected to the research were 33 groups performing joint sales of individual farmer 
output who admitted having problems with members deviating from group agreements 
and selling their output outside the groups. Most of those groups were established in 1998 
and 1999.  The oldest group in this category was created in 1992, the youngest in 2004.  
The groups associated an average of 97 farmers, which is the highest mean group size for 
all the identified categories.  The smallest group had only five members, the largest 141. 
The most popular legal forms among these groups were unions (33.3% of groups) and 
associations (30%).  Taking the formation factor into account, the majority of the groups 
were  initiated  by  direct  actions  of  involved  farmers  (63.6%)  and  36.3%  by  outside 
organizations  such  as  extension  services  (21.2%),  processing  companies  (9.1%), 
municipality cooperatives (3%), and outside businessmen (3%). 
Eighteen percent of  the  groups  were  functioning  as  Limited  Liability  Companies, 
15%  were  of  an  informal  character,  and  3%  (one  group)  chose  the  legal  form  of  a 
cooperative.    The  most  frequent  type  of  output  produced  by  the  members  was  pork 
(66.7%),  vegetables  (18.2%),  and  fruits  (6.1%);  there  was  one  group  (3%)  each  in 
potatoes, grain, and hop. On average these groups collected 8,051 EUR as start-up capital 
(282 EUR per member). 
All the groups performed the task of organizing joint sales.  Nonetheless, most of the 
groups also executed other activities.  Eighty-four percent of the groups organized 
trainings and educational trips for their members, 72% organized joint purchases of the   16 
means of production, 27% joint transportation, and 64% organized integration events for 
the members.  Two groups were also sorting, packing, and storing the produce, while two 
others provided insurance for their members, and one provided loans for their members. 
Eleven groups (33%) also applied for and received subsidies. 
Category 4:  Success 
Only seven producer groups, which were selling the output through the group and did not 
have problems with members deviating from the group agreements, were subjected to the 
research.  On  average  the  groups  were  established  in  2001:  the  oldest  group  was 
established in 1993 and the youngest in 2004.  The number of members per group was 
the highest in this category, equal to 75.7 members per group.  The smallest group had 
only five members, the largest 301. The most popular legal forms chosen among those 
groups  were  unions,  chosen  by  three  groups  (43%),  and  limited  liability  companies, 
chosen by three groups.  The remaining group operated as a cooperative.  Regarding the 
starting up capital on average the groups collected 10,221 EUR (1,174 EUR per member) 
With regard to the type of produced output, four groups produced vegetables (57.2%), 
two produced pork (28.6%), and one produced rape seed (14.3%).  Four groups (56.9%) 
were  initiated  by  the  direct  actions  of  involved  farmers,  two  groups  (28.6%)  by  a 
processing company, and one (14.3%) by a municipality cooperative.  
All the groups performed the task of organizing joint sales through the group.  Other 
activities  performed  by  the  groups  included  the  organization  of  joint  transportation 
(performed  by  57.1%  of  groups),  of  training  and  educational  trips  for  members 
(performed by 57.1% of groups), of joint supply of production means (42.9% of groups), 
and of integration events for the associated farmers (performed by 42.9% of the groups).  
Four other groups also performed less common types of activities: One group provided 
insurance,  storage  space,  and  other  services  such  as  soil  analyses.  Another  group 
slaughtered pigs produced by individual farmers, while yet another dried and purified 
rape seed.  One group in fresh tomatoes produced the goods jointly, which makes them 
similar to a production cooperative. Five groups in this category (71%) also managed to 
arrange subsidies.   
Table  1  presents  a  summary  of  characteristics  of  the  identified  producer  group 
categories.  The last row in the table also presents a comparison of the average size of the 
members’ agricultural holdings in each category.  Due to the difficulty of comparing 
different  agricultural  production  types,  the  data  we  present  only  deals  with  groups 
associating farmers who produce hogs, since most producer groups (56%) associated hog 
farmers.   
A  series  of  one-way  analyses  of  variance  ANOVA  was  run  in  order  to  identify 
whether  there  were  any  significant  differences  in  the  mean  scores  of  the  variables 
presented in Table 1 for the distinguished categories of success.  A significant difference 
in mean scores indicated the variable representing whether the group was formed from 
the initiative of the extension service (F(3, 58)=2.4, p=0.077).  The effect size was 0.11.  
The significant difference was between Category  1 and Category 4.   It suggests that 
considerably more groups that failed were initiated by the extension service than groups 
that achieved success.  
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The stars indicate significant differences in the mean scores of the variables for the distinguished categories of success: 
*** differences significant at .01 level 
**  differences significant at .05 level 
*    differences significant at .10 level 
 
The  mean  scores  for  choosing  the  legal  form  of  association  were  also  significantly 
different  at  p<0.05  level  (F(3,  58)=3.7,  p=0.16).    The  effect  size  was  0.10.    The 
significant  differences  were  between  Category  1,  Category  3,  and  Category  4,  which 
suggest  that  the  governance  form  of  association  is  more  frequent  among  groups  that 
failed than among those that achieved either partial or full success. 
Regarding the question of why the form of association was chosen, again we see a 
large impact of the extension service. Thirty percent of groups functioning as associations 
chose this form due to advice of the extension service. Others chose it because it was 
considered a “loose” form, which did not require capital investments (17%), because it   18 
was  a  cheap  form  (13%),  because  it  was  considered  to  provide  a  sufficient  level  of 
security (8%), or because farmers were not aware that there are other forms available 
(8%).  
We find a slightly significant but negative correlation between the choice of the legal 
form of association and the level of invested capital (p<0.1). This suggests that maybe the 
level of capital invested in associations was too small to enable the group to survive in 
the market. One such investment could be paying a salary to the leader for organizing the 
task of joint sales. A very significant negative correlation is found between choosing the 
legal form of association and paying a salary to the leader (p<0.01). Additionally, as 
discussed by Banaszak and Beckmann (2007: 186) leaders of producer groups who did 
not receive a salary were less likely to negotiate a high price premium.    
Regarding the type of production of the member farmers, the mean scores for only 
one variable – that is, producing vegetables – differed significantly at p<0.1 level (F(3, 
58)=2.28, p=0.089).  The effect size was medium and equaled to 0.10.  The difference 
was  between  Category  2  and  Category  4.    Vegetables  are  a  more  frequent  type  of 
production among successful groups than among those that suffered a partial failure.  
5.3 Characteristic of the Independent Variables 
In this section we present how we operationalize the propositions derived from theory in 
Section  2.  In  respect  to  the  likelihood  of  achieving  success  by  producer  groups,  the 
propositions derived from transaction costs analysis point to such factors as group size 
and  the  strength  of leadership  in  decision-making, selection  of  members  entering the 
organization, having an earlier business relationship with group members, mismatching 
of  capital  investments  with  governance  form,  and  functioning  in  a  competitive 
environment.  
Regarding the group size, each group associated an average of 71 members.  Group 
sizes, however, were greatly disproportionate, which is indicated by the high standard 
deviation.    The  smallest  group  had  only  five  members,  the  largest  700.  The  role  of 
leadership in decision-making was measured by asking the interviewed producer group 
leaders  whether  they  make  most  group  decisions.    The  mean  for  the  answers  to  the 
question reached 2.8 on a scale of 1 to 4, in which 1 stood for disagree and 4 for agree. 
Only 10 groups (16%) declared that their groups were homogenous.  Selection of partners 
for  the  alliance  was  measured  by  asking  whether  there  was  a  selection  process  of 
members during the group’s formation stage.  This had happened in 31% of the groups. 
The  existence  of  a  previous  business  relationship  was  measured  by  asking  the 
interviewed leaders whether one had existed with most of the group members.  Fourteen 
percent of them fully agreed with this statement, 9.7% partially agreed, 14.5% partially 
disagreed,  and  61.3%  disagreed  entirely.    Regarding  the  decision  on  allocation  of 
appropriate governance with respect to the invested capital, the groups were divided into 
three categories: those having start-up capital below 10,000 PLN (approx 2,600 EUR), in 
between 10,000 PLN and 50,000 PLN (approx 13,200 EUR), and above 50,000 PLN.  
Groups that misallocated their governance structure choice were those that had invested 
capital  below  10,000  PLN  and  chose  costly  forms  of  cooperative  or  limited  liability 
company (four such cases were identified); those that had invested a sum between 10,000 
and 50,000 and chose forms that did not providing enough security for invested capital, 
such as informal groups or associations (seven such cases were identified); and those that 
had invested over 50,000 PLN and additionally chose a form other than a cooperative or   19 
limited liability company (one such case was identified).  Division into the three groups 
was  motivated  by  actual  patterns  of  choosing  governance  forms  with  respect  to  the 
invested  capital.    Competition  was  measured  by  investigating  how  the  interviewees 
evaluated  market  relationships  with  the  main  competitors  of  producer  groups  – 
middlemen.    Fourteen  and  a  half  percent  of  the  groups  reported  experiencing  harsh 
competition with middlemen, and 30.6% found them minor competitors.  
The propositions derived from game theoretical analysis also highlighted the role of 
leadership,  the  number  of  members  and  competition.  Additionally,  the  propositions 
suggested that group homogeneity, availability  of information about past actions, and 
communication structures are also expected to facilitate cooperation. Group homogeneity 
was measured by asking the interviewees whether members of their groups had similar 
economic  potential.  Sixteen  percent  of  groups  were  homogenous.  Availability  of 
information about past actions was measured by investigating whether the members knew 
each other before establishing the producer group.  In most cases, all members were 
acquainted with each other (66%); in 29% the majority of the members knew each other 
before; and in only  3  groups (5%) the majority of the  members were  not previously 
acquainted.  Regarding communication structures, we asked the interviewees whether all 
members were involved in the initial stage of  planning  and designing  the  group.   In 
30.6% of the groups, all members were involved in the discussion; in 64% of the groups 
only some members were involved; and in 4.8% of the groups the decisions were made 
exclusively  by  the  initiative  actor,  and  there  was  no  discussion  with  other  members. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the distinguished independent variables.  
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables 
Variable 
 
Measurement  Coding  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Group size  Number of members  Number  62  71.77  112.
41 




Does the leader make most of 




62  2.81  1.01  1  4 
Selection of 
members 
Was there any selection 
process for the members? 
Yes-1, no-0  62  .31    0  1 
Business 
acquaintance 
Did the members have business 
relationships before establishing 
the group? 
4-all had, 3-majority, 
2-some, 1-none 




In respect to the amount of 
invested capital whether the 
group have chosen a form 
which is either too costly or not 
providing enough of security  
Yes-1, no-0  62  .20    0  1 
Competition  How would you evaluate the 
competition with the middlemen 




62  1.60  .73  1  3 
Homogeneity   Do members have similar 
economic potential? 
1-yes, no-0  62  .16    0  1 
Preplay 
acquaintance  
Did the members know each 
other before establishing the 
group? 
4-all members knew 
each other, 3-some 
didn’t know each 
other, 2-majority didn’t 
know each other, 1-
nobody knew each 
other 
62  3.61  .58  2  4  
Communication  Were all the members involved 
in the initial discussion about the 
group? 
1-none, 2-some, 3-all  62  2.26  .54  1  3   20 
5.4 Regression Modeling Results 
In order to measure the impact of the independent variables above on the distinguished 
categories of success of producer groups, we ran an ordinal probit regression.  A few 
pairs of independent variables were correlated with each other.  The regression was thus 
run stepwise.  The cut significance level was defined as p<0.1.  Additionally, due to 
perfect negative correlation between the variable indicating the number of members and 
the variable indicating the previous acquaintance, one of them had to be removed from 
the regression.  Since number of members was pointed out by both game theory and 
transaction  costs  theory  as  influencing  the  likelihood  of  setting  up  a  successful 
cooperation, this variable was kept in the model.  The regression results are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Stepwise Ordinal Probit Regression Results for the Distinguished 





Dependent variable  
 
Category of success: 1 to 4 
 
Leader’s strength                             .270 * 
                          .150 
No. of members                            .003 ** 
                          .001 
Selection of members                          1.037 *** 
                          .376 
Business acquaintance                            .526 *** 
                          .166 
Pseudo R2                            .209 
No. of  observation                              62 
The upper line in the row indicates coefficient; the bottom one indicates standard error 
*** significant at .01 level 
**   significant at .05 level 
*    significant at .10 level 
 
The strongest impact on the likelihood of producer group success was achieved by the 
variables indicating whether the members had had a previous business relationship and 
by the variable indicating whether there was a selection process of the members at the 
group’s  formation  stage.    The  variables  were  additionally  correlated  (p<0.01).    The 
finding supports Proposition 3 derived from the transaction costs prediction that the key 
element for success of hybrid modes of governance is the selection of partners based on 
previous experience in market relationships.  It might also explain the failure of the large 
proportion of producer groups that were established on the initiative of the extension 
service.  We might suspect that, while the extension service officials aimed at forming a 
producer  group  and  encouraged all  farmers  in  the  area  to  join  the  group,  the  groups 
formed  in  alternative  ways  were  more  selective  and  careful  about  choosing  potential 
partners.  A significant negative correlation was found between the variable indicating 
whether  the  group  was  formed  due  to  an  initiative  of  the  extension  service  and  the 
variable indicating whether there was a process of member selection (p<0.1).    
The  variable  that  had  the  second  strongest  significant  positive  impact  on  the 
likelihood of producer group success was the group size.  The larger the group, the more 
likely it was to be successful.  This supports Proposition 1 derived from transaction costs 
theory, which proposed  that larger organizations are  more likely to decrease per unit   21 
transaction costs, and that in addition, larger groups are less vulnerable to the danger of 
internal rent seeking and opportunistic behavior. The findings also confirms Proposition 8 
derived  from  game  theory.  However,  the  authors  referred  to  while  discussing  the 
proposition were not very clear about the sign of the expected relationship.  
Our finding that success is positively related to group size is somewhat in opposition 
to the discussion on provision of collective benefits. Olson (1965) argued that larger 
groups find it harder to communicate and coordinate their actions, which was expected to 
hinder cooperation. We might stipulate that leadership is the factor that counteracts the 
negative impact of enlarging group size on communication and coordination costs. This 
corresponds  to  the  finding  that  the  variable  indicating  leadership  decision-making 
strength was also significant. The stronger the leader, the more likely the group was to be 
successful.    This  confirms  Proposition  2  derived  from  transaction  costs  theory  that 
proposed that leadership contributes to saving on internal transaction costs and has a 
positive  impact  on  forming  successful  producer  groups.  The  finding  also  supports 
Proposition  7  drawn  from  game  theory  that,  irrespective of  game  settings,  leadership 
enhances cooperation. Additionally, since producer  groups operate in market settings, 
increasing the number of members and decreasing transaction costs might also increase 
the groups’ bargaining power and thus provide higher benefits to members. 
The second part of Proposition 2 suggested that a strong and dominant leader who 
captures information is a threat to the continuity of relationships in hybrids and therefore 
decreases  the  chances  of  having  a  successful  hybrid  arrangement.  The  findings  from 
Banaszak and Beckmann (2007: 186) suggest that this might also be the case. Leaders’ 
decision making power had a significant positive impact on the likelihood of the group 
entering  a  long-term  contract.  Nonetheless,  as  suggested  in  Banaszak  and  Beckmann 
(2006b: 18), selling group products through a long-term contract increases the likelihood 
of playing a prisoner’s dilemma game and thus might potentially increase deviation rates.  
The number of group members was additionally perfectly negatively correlated with 
the variable indicating previous acquaintance, which was excluded from the regression.  
It does suggest, however, that having ordinary previous knowledge of group members 
will have a negative impact on the likelihood of successful producer group formation. If 
one organization has too many overlapping social relationship layers, the organization 
might  experience  problems  with  members’  discipline  and  might  have  difficulties  in 
performing professional and business functions (Banaszak and Beckmann 2006b: 18).   
6 Conclusions 
The article investigated the question of success and failure of cooperation in agricultural 
markets. We also included disbanded organizations in the analysis. The empirical data 
were collected from 62 producer groups located in Wielkopolska Province, Poland. 
We proposed a new approach to investigating success and failure of farmers’ cooperative 
enterprises.   The  definition of  success  or  failure  of  the researched  organizations  was 
based  on  game  theory  and  transaction  costs  theory.    Game  theory  suggested  that 
successful  groups  manage  to  set  the  game  in  such  a  way  that  choosing  a  certain 
cooperative strategy brings the highest payoffs for the players and results in achieving a 
superior Nash equilibrium.  Players in such a situation have no incentives to deviate from 
the  group  agreements.    Transaction  costs  theory  suggested  that  successful  producer 
groups manage to coordinate the exchange between farmers and purchasers and operate   22 
at per unit costs that do not exceed the per unit costs of organizing the transaction through 
alternative ways.  
In order to measure such understood success and failure, we proposed a classification 
of the producer groups into four categories.  The first category contained 12 groups that 
had  stopped  functioning;  it  is  clear  that  these  groups  failed.    The  second  category 
contained 10 groups that were still functioning, but for different reasons were currently 
not performing their main task – organizing joint sales; we called this category a partial 
failure.  The third category was called partial success and comprised 33 groups that were 
functioning, performing joint sales, but still having problems with members shirking the 
group agreements and selling their output outside the group without group permission.  
This indicates that these groups did not manage to coordinate their members on strategy, 
which would have resulted in the highest possible payoffs to the members.  The fourth 
and  final  category  contained  seven  of  the  most  successful  groups,  which  were 
functioning, performing joint sales, and did not have problems with members deceiving 
group  agreements.    The  division  among  categories  three  and  four  was  significantly 
positively  correlated  to  the  price  premium  the  members  received  for  the  output  sold 
through the group, the variable indicating whether the group obtained higher benefits 
from functioning than costs, and the variable indicating self-perceived success.  
What is striking in the comparison of the identified success categories is that a major 
portion of failed  groups was established on initiative of the extension service (50%).  
Additionally,  none  of  the  groups  classified  as  successful  were  established  by  the 
extension  service.  There  is  also  significant  difference  in  adopting  the  legal  form  of 
association  between  the  groups  that  failed  and  those  that  were  successful.  The  most 
frequent reason to choose the legal form of association was due to advice of the extension 
service.  We suppose that the extension service employees might have lacked sufficient 
information  about  business  management  and  thus  they  advised  adopting  the  form  of 
association, which is cheap but does not provide safeguards for invested capital, and  
additionally  does  not  allow  members  to  withdraw  either  invested  capital  or  profits. 
Consequently it could discourage members to invest capital in such groups. Although we 
did not find significant differences in the level of invested capital in the distinguished 
categories of producer groups, some level of investments might be necessary to survive in 
the market.  
Another  interesting  finding  is  that  the  most  frequent  problem  among  groups  that 
failed entirely or partially concerned member commitment and leadership.  Considering 
the commitment problem, Banaszak  and Beckmann  (2006a: 18) suggest that member 
commitment, which is understood in terms of compliance with producer group rules, is 
mainly related to the payoffs from the group activity measured in the price premium 
members receive for output sold through the group.  This indicates that the groups that 
failed partially and entirely did not manage to provide high enough benefits for their 
members, which would have motivated them to commit to the group.  
Considering  the  problems  with  leadership,  Banaszak  and  Beckmann  (2006b:  27) 
show that groups have to compensate leaders for their work if they want to keep their 
work motivation high.  If a group does not solve this motivation problem, the leaders 
might be more willing to choose options that are less work intensive for themselves and 
that  are  less  valued  by  group  members.  This  could  result  in  hindering  or  eventually 
disbanding cooperation.    23 
Transaction costs theory and game theory also provided insights on factors that might 
contribute to formation of successful cooperative arrangements. Based on the discussion 
we derived 11  research propositions. The propositions were operationalized into nine 
independent variables. We measured the impact of the variables on four categories of 
success category using the technique of ordinal probit regression.  
Regarding the likelihood of achieving success in terms of the identified categories, 
the findings correspond to the results obtained by Ziegenhorn (1999: 66), who pointed 
out  that  leadership,  knowledge,  and  selection  of  network  participants  influence 
compatibility.  We show, however, that the quality of the knowledge of the participants is 
also important and should be based on previous business acquaintance.   
The most significant impact on the likelihood of group success was achieved by the 
variables  indicating  whether  the  members  had  had  a  business  relationship  before 
establishing the group, as well as the variable indicating whether there was a member 
selection process during the group’s formation.  Both variables were strongly correlated 
as well.  These findings support the proposition derived from transaction costs theory that 
the key to the success of hybrid modes of governance such as producer groups is the 
selection of partners based on previous experience in market relationships.  This finding 
might provide another explanation on the failure of such a large proportion of producer 
groups  established  by  the  initiative  of  the  extension  service.    We  might  suspect  that 
extension  service  officials  just  wanted  to  form  producer  groups  and  encouraged  all 
farmers in an area to join a group, while groups formed in alternative ways were more 
selective  and  careful  about  choosing  the  potential  partners.    A  significant  negative 
correlation was found between the variable indicating whether the group was formed by 
an initiative of the extension service and the variable indicating  whether there was a 
member selection process.    
The third variable with a significant positive impact on the likelihood of producer 
group  success  was  group  size.    The  larger  the  group,  the  more  likely  it  was  to  be 
successful.  This is in line with the proposition that suggested that the large organizations 
on one hand might decrease transaction costs, and on the other hand lower the danger of 
internal rent seeking and opportunistic behavior. 
The last variable with a positive impact on the likelihood of success was leadership 
strength. It supports the proposition derived from transaction cost theory which suggested 
that leadership might decrease internal transaction costs and thus make the organization 
more competitive.  It is also in line with the proposition derived from game theory that 
leadership  increases  chances  of  coordinating  members  on  efficient  equilibriums  and 
facilitates cooperation.  
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